H.R. 7567 · 119th Congress
Farm Bill 2.0

News · June 19, 2026

Title III Trade in Farm Bill 2.0: MAP, FMD, GSM-102, Food Aid

How H.R. 7567 reauthorizes the Market Access Program, FMD, GSM-102 export credit, and food aid, and what changed versus the 2018 Farm Bill.

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TL;DR: Title III of H.R. 7567 reauthorizes U.S. agricultural trade promotion and food aid programs. It proposes higher authorization ceilings for the Market Access Program (MAP, $200 million per year in 2018) and the Foreign Market Development Program (FMD, $34.5 million per year in 2018), and continues GSM-102 export credit guarantees, Food for Peace, and McGovern-Dole. Exact new figures are to be confirmed.

Key takeaway

Title III proposes higher authorization ceilings for MAP and FMD while keeping GSM-102 and food aid programs largely structurally unchanged from 2018.

What this section does

Title III of H.R. 7567 covers international agricultural trade promotion and food aid. It reauthorizes the Market Access Program (MAP), the Foreign Market Development Cooperator Program (FMD), and export credit guarantee programs including GSM-102. It also continues international food aid through Food for Peace (P.L. 480) and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program.

MAP and FMD are cost-share programs that help U.S. commodity groups, cooperatives, and food companies promote products overseas through trade shows, consumer promotions, and marketing. The USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) administers MAP, FMD, and GSM-102 consistent with current law. For the full breakdown of how the title fits into the bill, see our full bill summary.

GSM-102 provides credit guarantees that back private financing of U.S. agricultural exports to buyers in countries where credit is necessary to make sales. Food for Peace retains its commodity procurement and monetization framework, and the bill keeps the Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) authority, which allows buying commodities closer to recipient areas rather than only from U.S. sources.

What it means

Title III affects a broad set of agricultural exporters, aid groups, and commodity shippers. The practical impact varies by program and audience.

  • Commodity associations and food companies: Groups that use MAP and FMD cost-share funds for overseas marketing could see a higher authorization ceiling. Small and mid-size exporters typically access MAP through state and regional associations.
  • Exporters and foreign buyers: Sellers of bulk and high-value commodities who rely on GSM-102 to finance sales in credit-constrained markets, particularly in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, see continued program authority.
  • Food aid recipients and NGOs: Implementing organizations for Food for Peace and McGovern-Dole continue under existing authorities. U.S. commodity shippers whose business is tied to food aid cargo preference and monetization rules are also affected.
  • Exporters broadly: MAP and FMD successes in building foreign demand have distributional effects across whole commodity sectors, not just direct participants.

The bill maintains the 2018 expansion of LRP and does not reverse the shift toward flexible procurement, which commodity shippers have opposed and hunger-focused NGOs have supported. To compare these provisions against current law, see our what changed vs 2018 page.

Food for Peace monetization provisions, a persistent point of tension between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and commodity groups, are retained without the reform USAID proposed administratively in prior years. For program-by-program dollar context, see the funding breakdown.

What's next

As of June 2026, MAP and FMD authorization increases are proposals, not final spending. Actual funding depends on annual appropriations, which have historically lagged authorized levels. An authorization increase does not guarantee a spending increase, and FMD in particular has been flat-funded well below its authorized ceiling.

Several open questions remain. GSM-102 stays subject to World Trade Organization (WTO) scrutiny, and any structural change to guarantee fee levels or coverage terms could invite renewed trade challenges from Brazil or other exporters. Monetization reform remains a live dispute among USAID, hunger advocacy NGOs, and commodity groups, so implementation may face executive branch friction regardless of what Congress authorizes.

Conference committee negotiations, if the Senate produces a competing bill, could reduce MAP and FMD authorization levels, since Senate Agriculture has historically been more restrained on trade promotion spending. LRP authority scope and funding also remain contested, and cargo preference advocates may seek to limit LRP in floor amendments. Track movement on our Senate status and timeline and status pages.

Frequently asked questions

What does MAP actually pay for, and who decides which companies get the money?

MAP is a cost-share program that helps fund overseas marketing for U.S. agricultural products, including trade shows, consumer promotions, and advertising. The USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) administers MAP and allocates funds to commodity trade associations, cooperatives, and companies. Small and mid-size exporters generally access MAP through state and regional associations rather than applying directly. In the 2018 Farm Bill, MAP was authorized at $200 million per year.

How is FMD different from MAP, and why do both programs exist?

FMD, the Foreign Market Development Cooperator Program, focuses on long-term, generic market development for U.S. commodities, often through trade associations that build foreign demand for bulk products. MAP supports more direct, branded, and consumer-facing promotion. Both are FAS cost-share programs but serve different stages of market building. FMD was authorized at $34.5 million per year in the 2018 Farm Bill, far less than MAP.

Does GSM-102 cost taxpayers money, or does it pay for itself?

GSM-102 provides credit guarantees that back private financing of U.S. agricultural exports, mostly to buyers in credit-constrained markets. The program collects guarantee fees from users. Its structure is largely unchanged from 2018, partly because WTO dispute settlement rulings reshaped the program in earlier years and Congress has avoided major structural reform to stay compliant. Precise net cost figures are not provided in available summaries and are to be confirmed.

What is monetization, and why do some aid groups want to eliminate it?

Monetization is the practice of selling U.S. commodities donated as food aid in recipient or nearby markets to raise cash for aid programs. It is a persistent point of tension between USAID, which has sought reform, and U.S. commodity groups, who support it. H.R. 7567 retains the existing monetization authority within the Food for Peace framework without the reform USAID proposed administratively in prior years.

Can foreign-grown food be used in U.S. food aid programs under this bill?

Yes, to a degree. The bill retains Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) authority, which allows purchasing commodities closer to disaster or recipient areas rather than exclusively from U.S. sources. The 2018 Farm Bill modestly expanded LRP, and H.R. 7567 maintains that expansion. Hunger-focused NGOs have generally supported flexible procurement, while U.S. commodity shippers have opposed it.

What happens to these programs if the farm bill is not enacted?

If the farm bill is not enacted and Congress relies on a continuing resolution, trade promotion and food aid programs typically continue under existing authorities and appropriations rather than the new authorization levels in H.R. 7567. The proposed increases for MAP and FMD would not take effect until the bill is enacted and appropriators fund them. As of June 2026, appropriations are not finalized.

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